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Abstract: Quantum key distribution (QKD) has emerged as a secure solution of secret key distribution utilizing the well
established theories of modern physics. Since its introduction in 1984, many interesting and innovative ideas have been
proposed for QKD in order to improve the security and efficiency of the scheme keeping in view of its applications and
practical implementation. High error rate QKD scheme for long distance communication – the so-called KMB09 protocol
– is one such scheme which was designed to achieve longer communication distance in QKD, without compromising its
security, by allowing the utilisation of higher dimensional photon states which is not possible with standard BB84 scheme.
However the practical implementation of KMB09 protocol has not been presented yet because of its unique design. In
this paper, we propose a framework for the practical implementation of QKD system that runs KMB09 protocol in two
or more dimensions of photon states. We present the KMB09 based QKD system design and its simulation for practical
implementation based on the encoding of secret bits in higher order Gaussian beam spatial modes. The proposed
framework is specifically evaluated in terms of efficiency or success rate with two and four dimensions of photon states.
We find that the simulation results of the proposed framework are inline with the numerical and analytical results of the
same QKD model presented earlier.
Key words: Network security, quantum key distribution, opto-electronics

1. Introduction
Ever since the introduction of the computer ‘bit’, one of the most revolutionary developments in communication
technology is the quantum bits or Qubits based communication. This field has been classified as quantum technology and includes, but is not limited to, quantum computation and quantum information. The applications
of such technology towards cybersecurity are immense and its impact on how we view cyber security will stay
for a long time [1]. Most notably is the development of fast processing quantum computers and highly secure
communication with quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution (QKD) [2]. QKD comprises of cryptographic protocols using various photonic properties at the physical layer. Systems employing QKD enabled
sharing of secret cryptographic keys with unconditional security due to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and
quantum no-cloning theorem [3]. QKD shows better security compared to conventional classical techniques
that are mostly based on computational security [4–7]. It is believed that conventional security techniques
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will remain no longer secure in the presence of a full-fledged quantum computer. Hence, cryptosystems with
enhanced and optimized quantum features are required to fulfil the long-term requirements of communication
security in cyberspace.
Over the years numerous QKD system designs have been proposed and successfully implemented [8–
10]. However, new developments in optoelectronic devices such as lasers, SLM, DMD, and superconducting
nanowires, single-photon detectors, etc. [11–14] contribute towards the innovative development in QKD systems.
Today’s QKD protocols and systems utilize various degrees of freedom in photons i.e. polarization basis and
orbital angular momentum [15, 16]. In addition, holographic principles are used to facilitate the control of
structured light [11, 17] in the form of computer-generated holography (CGH). This also finds extensive use in
applications such as computer aided design, gaming, holographic video, automotive and communication. As the
requirement of secure channels for information transfer is increasing with expanding consumer needs, current
proposed QKD systems need to be assessed thoroughly. The provision of innovation in its design and integration
with emerging innovative technologies needs to be addressed.
In this paper, we present the framework for practical implementation of QKD system based on the
KMB09 protocol. To the best of knowledge the KMB09 protocol has not been practically implemented yet and
the benefits of utilising this protocol in a practical QKD system are still awaited. The main contribution of
our work is to present the practical approach to utilise KMB09 protocol for secure communication. KMB09
protocol allows to utilise higher dimensional photon states [18]. The simulation is performed with two and four
dimensional photon states. The simulation results are used to determine QKD protocol efficiency. The states
of simulation setup are generated using spatial modes of Hermite–Gaussian and Laguerre–Gaussian beams,
and also their superposition modes [19]. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
related work done towards the practical implementation of QKD systems. Section 3 explains the standard QKD
process with explanation of KMB09 protocol. Section 4 explains the details of holistic simulation setup. Section
5 presents and discusses the simulation results obtained with two and four dimension cases of KMB09 protocol.
Finally, we present the conclusion and highlights of future work.
2. Literature review
Over the past two decades there has been extensive research conducted on QKD systems utilizing various
photonic properties and various QKD protocols such as BB84, two-state and EPR (Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen) [20–23]. The first known reference architecture for practical QKD system was published by Mailloux
et al. in 2015 which they called qkd’x [24]. Their work supported the development and performance analysis
of a practical QKD system. They used a qkd’x framework to model polarization based prepare-and-measure
BB84 QKD system. They also provided a brief listing of qkd’x modelled optical component library that helped
other researchers in understanding and investigating other QKD architectures along with their security and
performance analysis. The computer modelling of opto-electronic systems was carried out by Engle et al. in
2015 [25] in the context of QKD system architecture. Their study involved three main systems which are
prepare-and-measure BB84 QKD system, decoy state enabled QKD system and measure-device-independent
QKD system.
Archana and Krithika presented the simulation of BB84 QKD protocol in [26]. Their work presented
detailed QKD system simulations but did not consider practical eavesdropping attacks. In [27] Hussain et al.
presented the numerical modelling of the QKD system which made use of higher dimension KMB09 protocol.
Their work mainly focuses on the aspect of utilising higher dimension quantum states in QKD simulation using
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a numerical approach but lacked the practical considerations of the QKD system. Shall et al. presented the
mathematical model of the QKD system using BB84 prepare-and-measure protocol [28]. Their simulator closely
depicts the results and behavior of a QKD system using nonideal conditions. However it lacked comparison
with newer QKD protocols.
The QKD system based on higher dimensional quantum states via orbital angular momentum (OAM)
and angular position (ANG) was initially reported by Mirhosseini et al. in [16]. For the generation of OAM and
ANG modes at faster rate, they make use of DMD at a rate of 4 KHz. They also integrate mode separator with
efficiency of 93%. They tried to encode OAM and ANG bases using a seven-dimensional alphabet and achieve
channel width of 2.05 bits per shift photons. Wang et al. proposed a high dimensional QKD system using semi
mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) of photon’s orbital angular momentum [29]. Their experimental setup also
shows high key generation rate as compared to previous setups by focusing antinoise ability under atmospheric
turbulence with high efficiency QKD system based on the clever utilisation of Hermite and Laguerre Gaussian
modes.
A QKD system with biased basis using decoy states in term of practical implementation has been deeply
discussed and reported by Mao et al. in [30]. According to their scheme, the signal pulse must be prepared
in X and Z basis, but the weak decoy state must be prepared in only X basis in contrast to standard decoystate method with biased basis. Based upon their scheme they presented numerical modelling in combination
with the weak coherent source in many flavors e.g. statistical variations and full parameter boundary testing.
Results have opened several paths of technical research in the area of QKD. The scheme also provides speedy
key generation process and greater transmission efficiency in comparison with biased basis and three-intensity
decoy state generator. Performance efficiency is also increased using full parameter optimization.
3. QKD protocols
QKD involves the encoding of digital information into quantum states in contrast to classical communication
in which digital bits are encoded into electrical signals. Normally, various photonic properties play pivotal role
in the generation of quantum states. Researchers have developed several protocols to exploit these properties
to get the secured transfer of information. These may be divided into two broad categories: (1) Prepare-andmeasure based protocols and (2) Entanglement based protocols. Here we focus on prepare-and-measure QKD
that is relatively easier to implement with conventional BB84 protocol but there challenges associate with the
implementation of KMB09 protocol because of freedom of increasing the dimensions of photon states to achieve
long distance QKD communication.
3.1. The basic QKD protocol
The well-known BB84 protocol developed in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard is considered to be the standard
and most basic QKD protocol that comes under the category of prepare-and-measure based protocols [31]. The
BB84 protocol, named after its cofounders and the year of invention, makes use of photon’s polarization states
for information encoding by selecting any two sets of nonorthogonal mutually unbiased bases (MUBs). MUBs
in the Hilbert space are the bases which consists set of orthonormal states and their inner product magnitude
square (one state from each basis) is equal to the inverse of the dimension [32]. The protocol is no doubt the
most famous and the most noticeable among all QKD protocols. The security proof of this protocol against
arbitrary eavesdropping strategies was first proved by Mayers [33], and a simple proof was later shown by Shor
and Preskill [20].
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Generally, in BB84 QKD protocol, two bases each having two-dimensional states are used for encoding
classical bits. The rectilinear basis ⊕ at, for example, 0◦ degree and +90◦ polarisation of photon states
represented via intuitive symbols |0⟩ and |1⟩ while the diagonal basis ⊗ which consists of +45◦ and +135◦
polarisation of photon states represented as |+⟩ and |−⟩ respectively [34]. Hence, there are two sets of states
each belonging to respective mutually unbiased basis
⊕=



|0⟩ , |1⟩

and

⊗=



|−⟩ , |+⟩

(1)

where
|0⟩ =

 
1
= Q00 ,
0

|1⟩ =

 
0
= Q01
1

and

1
|−⟩ = √ (|0⟩ − |1⟩) = Q10 ,
2

1
|+⟩ = √ (|0⟩ + |1⟩) = Q11
2

According to standard BB84 protocol, the relationship between the digital information bits and their
respective quantum states are described in Table 1. The overall QKD protocol consists of two main phases in
which the first one facilitates the exchange of qubits through a quantum communication channel and the second
one facilitates classical communication for the accomplishment of final shared key [35, 36].

Table 1. Encoding scheme of the basic BB84 protocol.

Bits
0
1

Basis
⊕
⊗
Q00 Q10
Q01 Q11

Phase 1: Quantum transmission (over quantum channel)
1. Alice and Bob agree on sending and receiving the encoded photon states Qij belonging to the set of

mutually unbiased bases M ∈ ⊕, ⊗ . The selection of states is performed from a set of randomly

n
selected bits D ∈ 0, 1
according to Table 1.
2. Let Qij be a quantum state of photon prepared and transmitted by Alice to Bob for each randomly
selected bit according to Table 1. This communication of qubits is accomplished using quantum channel.
3. By randomly selecting the bases ⊕ or ⊗ , Bob measures every transmitted qubit on reception and records
his measured qubit Dij .
4. Before finalising the shared key bits Bob waits for the public discussion over the classical channel.
Phase 2: Public discussion (over classical channel)
1. For each qubit Qij prepared and sent by Alice and measured by Bob as Dij :
(a) Bob publicly announces his measurement basis Mi ∈ M which he used to measure each of the
incoming qubits Dij .
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(b) Alice, in response, publicly tells Bob to discard all those cases in which she finds a basis mismatch of
prepared and measured qubits. Hence, both parties discard all such cases and consider the remaining
bits as the shared key.
2. Alice selects arbitrary subset of the remaining shared bits and compare them publicly with Bob on classical
channel.
3. If the difference of bits is found near 25%, they consider it as the error due to possible intercept and resend
attempt by the eavesdropper and resume the protocol by discarding all the shared bits. Otherwise, they
proceed to use the shared secret key by applying necessary classical algorithms for error correction and
privacy amplification.
3.2. The KMB09 protocol
The KMB09 protocol named after its inventors Khan, Murphy and Beige is famous because of its ability to
run with higher dimensional photon states [18]. By design it is better than standard BB84 protocol in term of
variety of higher error rates due to eavesdropping. In addition to conventional quantum bit error rate (QBER),
it allows to calculate the eavesdropping error rate in terms of the index transmission of photon states i.e.
the index transmission error rate (ITER). However, this important advantage is achieved at the cost of lower
efficiency than standard BB84 protocol. Brierley [37] explains the utilization of bases with higher dimensional
photon states in KMB09 protocol in order to further improve the eavesdropping error rate. In KMB09 protocol,
Alice and Bob use two bases τ and υ , as explained in [38], which can be written as:
τ ∈



|τ b ⟩ : b = 1, 2, ..., N

υ∈

and



|υ b ⟩ : b = 1, 2, ..., N

(2)

Although the protocol is extendable to N dimensions for which the encoding bits explained in Table 2.
For concrete bases examples in N = 2 dimensions, the KMb09 protocol uses same bases set as BB84, refer to
Eq (1). For N = 4 dimensions, we may have following bases set of two MUBs as also defined in [18]:
τ =
where



|τ 1 ⟩ , |τ 2 ⟩ , |τ 3 ⟩ , |τ 4 ⟩

 
1
0

|τ 1 ⟩ = 
0 ,
0



1
1 1 
,
|υ 1 ⟩ = 
2 −1
−1

 
0
1

|τ 2 ⟩ = 
0 ,
0


and

υ=



|υ 1 ⟩ , |υ 2 ⟩ , |υ 3 ⟩ , |υ 4 ⟩

 
0
0

|τ 3 ⟩ = 
1 ,
0


−1
1 1 
,
|υ 2 ⟩ = 
2 1 
−1

 
0
0

|τ 4 ⟩ = 
0
1



1
1 −1
,
|υ 3 ⟩ = 
2 1 
−1

(3)

and

 
1
1
1

|υ 4 ⟩ = 

2 1
1

Again the complete protocol runs in the following two phases as BB84 protocol:
Phase 1: Quantum transmission (over quantum channel)
1. First, Alice generates a photon state to transmit to Bob by randomly selecting from |τ b ⟩ and |υ b ⟩ states.
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2. Bob measures the incoming photon states from Alice by randomly switching between two bases τ and υ
and records his measurement outcome.
3. Before finalising the shared key bits Alice and Bob wait for the public discussion over the classical channel.
Phase 2: Public discussion (over classical channel)
1. After the transmission and measurement of all photon states Alice reveals the index of each of the photon
states she sent to Bob on a public channel.
2. Bob matches the indices revealed by Alice with the corresponding indices of his computed states and
publicly reveals all those cases in which an index mismatch is found.
3. Both Alice and Bob interpret their results according to Table 2 and discard all those cases in which they
do not find any shared key bit.
4. Alice and Bob perform calculation of errors in key transmission to disclose any possible attempt of
eavesdropping.
5. After finding no evidence of eavesdropping they apply classical processes of error-correction and privacy
amplification.

Table 2. KMB09 protocol encoding scheme.

Index by Alice
1
2
3
4
...
N

Measurement by Bob (bits)
|τ 1 ⟩ |τ 2 ⟩ |τ 3 ⟩ |τ 4 ⟩ ...
×
1
1
1
...
1
×
1
1
...
1
1
×
1
...
1
1
1
×
...
... ... ... ... ...
1
1
1
1
...

|τ N ⟩
1
1
1
1
...
×

|υ 1 ⟩
×
0
0
0
...
0

|υ 2 ⟩
0
×
0
0
...
0

|υ 3 ⟩
0
0
×
0
...
0

|υ 4 ⟩
0
0
0
×
...
0

...
...
...
...
...
...
...

|υ N ⟩
0
0
0
0
...
×

KMB09 is a unique QKD protocol that exhibits two different types of errors that may provide a signature
for the possible eavesdropping attempt of an attacker. Its another important feature is that it allows to switch
the dimensions of photon states to any higher level in order to achieve improved security. To the best of
our knowledge until now there has been no known attempt towards the practical implementation of KMB09
protocol. In the next section, we present the design of our practical KMB09 QKD setup with its simulation
details. Our simulation of the practical system has been test for desired efficiency of KMB09 protocol for the
case of N = 2 and N = 4 dimensions. We believe that this simulation will help in the detailed analysis of the
KMB09 protocol.
4. Simulation setup
Similar to any communication system, the overall model of QKD system consists of two communicating parties
Alice and Bob as shown in Figure 1. Alice and Bob use two channels, the first being the classical channel
consisting of digital bits ( 0, 1 ) and the second being the quantum channel which is used for the transportation
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of qubits in the form of polarized photon states or any other degree of freedom to exchange secret key information
between Alice and Bob. The quantum unit on both sides of the system handles the quantum states generation,
detection and their interpretation in terms of secret keys. The network unit establishes digital communication
between both the systems at a higher network layer. The processor unit supervises overall activity and ensures
that the overall communication process is completed successfully with high efficiency.

Figure 1. QKD basic system.

The quantum unit on both sides of the QKD system generates and controls the real time qubits by using
computer generated binary holograms (CGBH) that is utilized by a type of SLM known as digital micromirror
device (DMD). The optical engine (consisting of beam expander, mode cleaners, beam splitters etc.) within
the quantum unit, also helps in the generation and propagation of Hermite–Gaussian and Laguerre–Gaussian
beam spatial modes. For comparison of our system wide simulation results with those obtained analytically and
numerically of the KMB09 protocol [18] we restrict our simulation to the cases of N = 2 and N = 4 dimensions.
This includes designing the quantum unit, as shown in Figure 2 and a a detailed block level design as shown
in Figure 3. The Laser is the basic constituent of all QKD systems for photonic communication. The different
chemical and electrical properties of laser decides the propagation of photonic beam. For our simulation setup
the laser has a polarized spectrum with a wavelength of 632 nm and having mode structure T EM00 greater
than 95%. A T EM00 mode structure means that it follows the basic Gaussian beam having complex amplitude
with phase angle in free space due to paraxial approximation as shown below [39]:
W0
exp
E(r, z) = E 0
W (z)
where E0 = Peak amplitude,
K = Wavenumber ( 2π/λ ),

(

)
"(
)#
r2
z
Kr2
−
exp ι Kz − arctan
+
W (z)2
zR
2R(z)

z = Direction of propagation,

λ = Wavelength,

(4)

W (z) = Beam waist,

zR = Rayleigh length

and

R(z) = Radius of curvature.

The next component is the attenuator which decreases the laser power to modify the light beam in a
controlled manner. The effect of reducing the laser pulse power leads to the creation of weak coherent pulses
that contains minimal mean photon number (MPN) per pulse. For our simulation setup we choose a value of
MPN to be 0.6 per pulse. This value has been shown to be experimentally valid as in [40]. The other notable
component is the Galilean beam expanders utilized for the expansion of laser beam width with respect to the
incident area of the SLM.
The SLM is the most important component of the currently designed QKD system [12, 41]. It is used for
amplitude, phase or polarization modulation of light waves of the Gaussian laser beam to produce other modes
of interest such as a Hermite–Gaussian (HG) and Laguerre–Gaussian (LG) beam spatial modes. SLM devices
are divided into two categories namely the transmissive type and the reflective type [42]. Transmissive type
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Figure 2. Quantum states generation and detection in two-dimensional KMB09 QKD system.

Figure 3. QKD system block diagram.

are made of liquid crystal material which are translucent [43] and the reflective type are made of liquid crystal
microdisplays (LCOS) or small micromirrors (usually referred to as DMD) [44]. DMD contains row and column
combination of many micro mirrors that are switched on and off by digital signals through a computer. This
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allows us to reflect the the incident light beam by ±12 degrees. The DMD pattern is controlled by dedicated
computer software that has already processed the required binary hologram in the form of matrices essential
for the generation of HG and LG beam spatial modes. Our simulation setup comprises of a DMD contains an
array of 1024 × 768 micrometer sized mirrors with total active screen area of 14 × 10 mm and having 13.68 µm
micromirror pitch.
For Cartesian coordinates, the amplitude and the phase angle terms of the Gaussian function Eq. (4)
with respect to Hermite polynomial [45] is given as follows:

1
AHG (x, y, z) =
ω(z)
and

r

(√ )
( √ )
"(
)2 #
y
2(1−n−m)
x
ρ
Hn
Hm
exp
−
πn!m!
ω(z)
ω(z)
ω(z)

#
ιKρ2
exp[−ιKz]
ΦHG (x, y, z) = exp[ι(n + m + 1)ξ(z)]exp −
2R

(5)

"

(6)

where n and m are positive integers.
Similarly for cylindrical coordinates, the amplitude and the phase angle terms of the Gaussian function
Eq. (4) with respect to Laguerre polynomial [45] is given as follows:
s
ALG

ω0
=
ω(z)

and

2p!
π(|ℓ| + p)!

√

2ρ
ω(z)

!|ℓ|

"(
L|ℓ|
p

ρ
2
ω(z)

)2 #
exp

"(

ρ
−
ω(z)

)2 #
(7)

"

ΦLG

#
ιKρ2
exp[−ιℓφ]
= exp[ι(2p + |ℓ| + 1)ξ(z)]exp −
2R

(8)

where, ℓ(Z) denotes azimuthal index number and , p(N) denotes radial index number.
The LG beam spatial modes have some important characteristic that are useful for the whole process of
QKD system or quantum state tomography (QST). Compared to standard form i.e. LG00 , the higher order
spatial LG modes have an extra rotating phase factor eιℓθ concentric at origin [46]. This revolving phase term
creates continuous visible radial component and its beam has what we call OAM around the axis. Each photon
acquires OAM which is equal to the ℓ (OAM quantum number in ℏ units). It is this special characteristic of
OAM which makes the ℓ an essential quantum digit for the encoding of secret key over radial index number p
[41].
4.1. N = 2 dimensions
For a two-dimensional state space the corresponding LG spatial modes have ℓ ∈ {+1, −1} and p = 0 . From the
above explanation, we now have the essential standard basis |R⟩ which refers to |0⟩ or ℓ = 1 , and |L⟩ which
refers to |1⟩ or ℓ = −1 as shown in Figure 4. This standard additional MUB is required for the measurement
of a two dimensional QKD system [41, 47]. The superposition of these LG spatial modes will create further two
MUBs [40]. Rectilinear basis comprises of |V ⟩ and |H⟩ from |±⟩ = |0⟩ ± |1⟩ . Diagonal basis comprises of |D⟩
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and |A⟩ from |±ι⟩ = |0⟩ ± ι |1⟩ . Finally, we have successfully compiled total of three MUBs with the help of
following relations:



|R⟩
|L⟩


=⇒

|τ ⟩ =

|R⟩ + |L⟩
|R⟩ − |L⟩




and

|υ⟩ =


|R⟩ + ι |L⟩
.̇
|R⟩ − ι |L⟩

(9)

Figure 4. 2-dimensional standard basis analogy.

4.2. N = 4 dimensions
For a four-dimensional state space the corresponding LG spatial modes have ℓ ∈ {+1, −1, +3, −3} and again
p = 0 . As discussed in Section 4.1, we must need essential standard basis which refers to |R1 ⟩ or ℓ = +1 ,
|L1 ⟩ or ℓ = −1 , |R2 ⟩ or ℓ = +3 and |L2 ⟩ or ℓ = −3 for the measurement purpose as shown in Figure 5.
The superposition of these LG spatial modes will further create other two MUBs required for the QKD process
[40, 48]. Finally, we have successfully compiled all three MUBs as follows, which are required for our simulation
setup to execute the KMB09 protocol using higher order LG and HG spatial modes.

|R1 ⟩
 |L1 ⟩ 


|R2 ⟩
|L2 ⟩


=⇒



|R1 ⟩ + |L1 ⟩
|R1 ⟩ − |L1 ⟩

|τ ⟩ = 
|R2 ⟩ + |L2 ⟩
|R2 ⟩ − |L2 ⟩

and



|R1 ⟩ + ι |L1 ⟩
|R1 ⟩ − ι |L1 ⟩

|υ⟩ = 
|R2 ⟩ + ι |L2 ⟩ .̇
|R2 ⟩ − ι |L2 ⟩

(10)

Figure 5. 4-dimensional standard basis analogy.

In either case of HG or LG spacial modes, the required holograms matrices equations, which are encoded
on the DMD, will be similar in nature except for their specific amplitude and phase terms [45] i.e.
h
i
ΦSLM = f AΦ ΦHG/LG + Gx X + Gy Y
3344
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where f AΦ is the amplitude phase function can be found easily by numerical evaluation from the following
relation:
h
i
J1
f AΦ = AHG/LG
(12)
where, J 1 is the first order Bessel function and AHG/LG is the amplitude found in the Eqs. (5 and 7).
As the holograms are developed according to the desired higher order Gaussian beam spatial modes,
this pattern will be displayed on the DMD. This is achieved by using the special SLM driver board controlled
separately by computer software control code. When the laser light beam is incident on the DMD surface area,
the reflective mirrors of the DMD (based on desired hologram pattern) will produce various higher order spatial
modes i.e. HG or LG. The mode cleaner module now selects the 1st order spatial mode and removes the other
modes. As far as the experimental setup is concerned, the spatial modes wave-fronts can be monitored at the
reception side, i.e. Bob, on a high definition CCD camera which is attached to a computer.
The detection or sorting process consists of a polarization check and matched filtering. The polarization
check is carried out by an optical Mach–Zehnder interferometer (MZI). The MZI is used for variation checking
in the relative phase shift measurement of the two beams generated from the same single source and propagating
independently. Laser beams phase measurement are independently monitored in the polarization block and the
same beam propagates further towards the matched filter in which a projective-based method is used [40]. In
this method the laser beam coherent pulse containing photons is incident on a device that makes projection
with respect to the OAM eigenstate before measurement. Once again the dynamically created CGBH of phase
patterns are utilized for such purpose. The holograms are displayed on the transmissive type SLM coupled with
single-mode fiber (SM Fiber). If the incoming photon state is conjugate with respect to the phase hologram
of SLM, then the nonzero value of ℓ will be converted into standard Gaussian T EM00 like mode and impacts
on the SM fiber along the axis of the fiber and hence increments the photon count. Alternatively, other modes
will be nullified and no photons detected or sorted [40, 49]. The SM fiber paths are then merged optically and
then both of the outputs are directed towards single-photon counting block or single photon avalanche diode
(SPAD) as shown in Figure 3.
4.3. Simulation details
The firmware was developed for the simulation of KMB09 QKD protocol using Python language version 3.7
(64 bit) over Visual Studio platform (2019). The main open source libraries which were used in support of the
simulation are matplotlib, slm-essentials, skimage, csv, PIL an CV2. Mainly there are two core processes: (1)
Random generation of quantum states and (2) Detection of the quantum states using match filter logic. All
SLM parameters are set as already explained in the simulation setup section. The fundamental steps required
to carry out the complete simulation process is as follows:
1. First, all the SLM (DMD) parameters are initialized and a blank array of SLM screen size is created.
2. With the help of our customised slm-essentials library the above generated blank arrays is processed that
results in creating the quantum states amplitude matrices. This also generates the holograms required
practically to drive the SLM for the generation of specified higher order Gaussian beam spatial mode, i.e
HG and LG modes.
3. The randomly generated quantum states amplitude matrices are separately stored for the transmission
process.
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4. Once the transmission process starts, the detection logic is applied on one state at a time with the help
of matched filter mechanism. This is accomplished using open source skimage library, which is famous for
structural similarity index measure (SSIM). The incoming quantum state’s amplitude matrix is multiplied
by the conjugate phase matrix of hologram of specified standard basis Gaussian state. The resulting plot
is then compared with the standard T EM00 mode using skimage metrics.
5. The SSIM value decides the increment or decrements of photon counts of corresponding higher order
Gaussian state.
6. At the end of simulation process and according to KMB09 protocol flow, the efficiency η is calculated
using simply the division of the total number of the correct outcomes and the total number of quantum
states generated at transmission sides.
7. While simulating the KMB09 protocol in both the mentioned dimensions, all above steps are followed with
only change in dimension variables (which shows change in standard basis and corresponding measurement
basis only).
5. Results
In this section we present and compare system efficiency η results of KMB09 protocol in two and four
dimensional state. η is a universally accepted system metric for a QKD system [18, 50, 51] and is given
by Eq. (13). The KMB09 protocol analytical and numerical results [18] are compared to our system results
obtained after KMB09 protocol simulation. The simulation setup was carried out as discussed in Section 4.3.
ηA =

N −1
2N

(13)

where η A = Analytical efficiency and N = Number of dimension.
The design of the proposed setup is such that the system first generates the CGBH as shown in Figure 6
for all the 3 MUBs, according to the DMD specified resolution in terms of pixels ratio i.e. 1024 × 768. This
starts the QKD process according to the KMB09 protocol. Number of iterations occur several times and the
system’s efficiency η S is noted against each iteration i. The results are shown in Figure 7 wherein the y-axis
denotes the efficiency η S and the x-axis denotes the number of iterations performed on the simulated QKD
system. From Figure 7 we observe that as we increase the number of iterations in our system, the value of η S
converges to a mean of 0.25 in case of two dimension and 0.3683 in case of four dimension.
The effect of number of iterations i.e. i = {50, 100, 150, 200, 250} on the accuracy of average system
efficiency η S has also been explored and the results given in Figure 8. The figure has η S of the simulated
system on the y-axis and the number of iterations i on the x-axis. We observe from Figure 8 that average
value of η S for KMB09 approaches η A in both cases i.e. for two dimension it has a value of 0.25 and for four
dimension it has a value of 0.3683.

Error

%=

ηS − ηA
× 100
ηA

(14)

Finally Figure 9 depicts the % error between the η S and η A obtained at selected number of iterations
i.e. i = {50, 100, 150, 200, 250}. Eq. (14) is used to compute the % error of the simulated and analytical
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Figure 6. Wavefront results obtained from Gaussian standard mode through desired hologram patterns.

Figure 7. Efficiency of KMB09 protocol in 2 and 4 dimensions as a result of proposed system simulation.

efficiency for n = 2 and 4 dimensions. For the two dimension case we observe that the % error is maximum
for 50 iterations and reaches a minimum value of approximately 1.25% when the number of iterations are
250. However, we observe some variation in values between 50 and 250 iterations which subsequently settles
to a stable value at 250 iterations. However for the four dimensional case, we observe from Figure 9 that the
simulation setup provides a stable value of 1.8% for % error at 250 iterations. The variation in the value for
this case is minimal when compared to the two dimensional case.
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Figure 8. Effect of number of iterations on the average
efficiency of KMB09 simulated system.

Figure 9. % Error in average efficiency of KMB09 protocol (analytical and simulated) for N = 2 and N = 4 cases.

6. Conclusion
Higher dimensional quantum key distribution protocols have many advantages over other conventional protocols
but their system simulation and implementation is very challenging. KMB09 is one such protocol whose twodimensional and four-dimensional versions are simulated between end to end users via the proposed QKD system
simulation setup. To compare the accuracy of the simulated system we use efficiency η as the QKD system
performance metric and compare it with the numerical and analytical efficiencies of the KMB09 QKD protocol
in both cases. From the obtained results, we see that the system efficiency for both methods converges to a
value of 0.25 in the case of two dimensions and 0.3683 in the case of four dimensions . This shows that the
accuracy of our simulated QKD system is inline with that of the analytical model. In the future, work we aim
to evaluate the proposed QKD setup for error rate due to eavesdropping as a result of intercept-and-resend
attack.
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